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INTRODUCTION

In Bandemer v. Ford Motor Company, 1 the Minnesota Supreme
Court recognized specific personal jurisdiction over Ford Motor Company
because the “substantial connection between the defendant Ford, the forum
Minnesota, and the claims brought . . . suffice[d] to establish specific
personal jurisdiction over the company.” 2 The court held that a Minnesota
court had specific personal jurisdiction over Ford because of its targeted
advertising, sales, and marketing in the state. 3
This Paper begins with a brief history of Minnesota’s approach to
personal jurisdiction and the underlying justifications that led to the
Bandemer decision. 4 The facts and procedural history of Bandemer follow. 5
The analysis of this Paper considers two opposing opinions. The first
opinion argues that Bandemer, on its face, is consistent with International
Shoe, 6 as well as the evolution of personal jurisdiction analysis. 7
Additionally, the decision in Bandemer supports the efficiency of the court. 8
Next, the second opinion argues that the court erred in granting specific
personal jurisdiction because Ford’s contacts with Minnesota were not
targeted actions, but general conduct. 9 This analysis focuses on the first three
factors in Minnesota’s five-pronged test for satisfying federal due process.
This Paper was researched and written prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bandemer on March 25, 2021. As such, the Supreme
Court’s decision and analysis are not considered in this Paper. However,

ǂ Kevin

Deno is a 2L full-time student at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. He graduated
from Macalester in 2011 with B.A. in Classics and now focuses on intellectual property,
business, and employment law.
ǂ ǂ John-Paul Dees is a 2L full-time student at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. He graduated
from St. Thomas in 2016 with a B.A. in Operations and Supply Chain Management and
now focuses on health and business law.
Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019).
Id. at 755.
Id.
See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings
in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81. They should be construed,
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”).
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)
(requiring more than general connections for specific personal jurisdiction).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
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the Supreme Court ultimately held that Ford was properly subject to specific
personal jurisdiction in Minnesota and Montana. 10
II.

HISTORY

Personal jurisdiction is one of several mechanisms guiding civil
procedure that plays a critical “role in many civil disputes in the United
States.” 11 When a “defendant resides in, [or] is incorporated or
headquartered in . . . the particular state where the suit is brought, personal
jurisdiction generally is found to exist and is unproblematic.” 12 However,
problems generally “arise when a plaintiff sues the defendant in a state other
than the one in which the defendant is located.” 13

A.

Brief Overview of General Personal Jurisdiction and Specific Personal
Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction over a defendant requires proper service to
the “defendant in the state in which the court sits, and the defendant needs
to voluntarily appear in court.” 14 Personal jurisdiction is commonly
established through either general personal jurisdiction 15 or specific personal
jurisdiction. 16 “General [personal] jurisdiction may be amenable to narrowly
defined categories, [however] specific [personal] jurisdiction is not.” 17
Additionally, personal jurisdiction can be waived, and if a defendant appears
in court without objecting to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction,

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court et al., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032
(2021) (holding that the connection between the claims and Ford’s in state activities were
sufficient for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction in both Minnesota and Montana).
Robert E. Pfeffer, A 21st Century Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 13 U. N.H. L. REV.
65, 66 (2015).
10

11

12
13

Id.
Id.
Personal

Jurisdiction, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
personal_jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/CP5T-9JFN].
General Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A court's authority to
hear a wide range of cases, civil or criminal, that arise within its geographic area.”). General
jurisdiction is also known as all-purpose jurisdiction.
Specific Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Jurisdiction
based on a person’s minimum contacts with the forum state when the claim arises out of or
is related to those contacts.”). Specific personal jurisdiction is also known as conduct-linked
jurisdiction.
Brief for Civil Procedure Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Ford
Motor Co. v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (2020) (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 1902363,
at *1 [hereinafter Brief for Civil Procedure Professors].
14

15

16

17
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“then the court will assume that the defendant is waiving any challenge to
personal jurisdiction.” 18
General personal jurisdiction is properly asserted by a court over
an out-of-state corporation “when the corporation’s affiliations with the State
in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render it
essentially at home in the forum State.’” 19 An individual is “at home” in the
state that is his or her domicile, 20 whereas a corporation is “at home” in its
state of incorporation “and in the state that is [its] principal place of
business.” 21
Specific personal jurisdiction considers two factors: (1) “the extent
of the contacts,” which must comport with the requirements dictated within
the forum’s long-arm statute; 22 and (2) “the relation between defendants’
contacts” and the forum state. 23 In a case involving specific personal
jurisdiction, each claim must be evaluated using the aforementioned
factors. 24 Furthermore, a single or occasional action within a state might be
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction if the action is sufficiently related
to the suit. 25 In practice, “specific [personal] jurisdiction has been a far more
flexible inquiry into the relationship among the forum, the defendant, and
the dispute.” 26
Additionally, the relationship between the forum, the defendant,
and the dispute requires an analysis of the defendant’s rights in relation to
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 The Due Process

Personal Jurisdiction, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/personal
_jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/CP5T-9JFN]; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). A foreign corporation is either a literal
corporation located in a foreign country or a corporation that is headquartered or domiciled
in a sister-state of the United States. See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 564 U.S. 915.
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 85 (Rachel E. Barkow
et al. eds., 10th ed. 2019); see also Domicile, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(“The place at which a person has been physically present and that the person regards as
home; a person's true, fixed, principal, and permanent home . . .” or “[t]he residence of a
person or corporation for legal purposes.”).
YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20 at 85; see also Corporate Domicile, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The place considered by law as the center of corporate affairs,
where the corporation’s functions are discharged; the legal home of a corporation, usu[ally]
its state of incorporation or the state in which it maintains its principal place of business.”).
YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20 at 85; JOHN T. CROSS, LESLIE W. ABRAMSON &
ELLEN E. DEASON, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES, PROBLEMS, AND EXERCISES 68 (4th ed. 2016).
YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id.; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note 17, at 1.
CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 68.
18

19

20

21

22

23
24
25

26
27
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Clause establishes the boundaries for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 28
However, state legislatures have tightened these limitations through their
own long-arm statutes. 29 These long-arm statutes allow plaintiffs to serve
process on non-resident defendants who are not physically present within
the forum state. 30
There are two types of long-arm statutes: laundry-list long-arm
statutes and due process long-arm statutes. 31 Essentially, laundry-list longarm statutes list activities that the forum state’s legislature decided will
subject non-resident defendants to the forum’s jurisdiction. 32 If the
defendant’s conduct falls within the parameters of the laundry-list long-arm
statute, then a plaintiff may serve the defendant with process. 33 Yet, even if
the court can exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant through
the laundry-list long-arm statute, this exercise may fail because exercising
jurisdiction may not comply with the Due Process Clause’s notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 34 Thus, laundry-list long-arm statutes utilize a
two-step analysis to exercise jurisdiction; first checking the statute’s listed
activities, then checking for constitutional due process. 35
Conversely, due process long-arm statutes permit courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to limits allowed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 For example,
California’s code states, “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States.” 37 Other states have more verbose statutes, like Rhode Island’s:
Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident
of this state or his executor or administrator, and every
partnership or association, composed of any person or
persons, not such residents, that shall have the necessary
minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall be
subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island, and
the courts of this state shall hold such foreign corporations
and such nonresident individuals or their executors or
administrators, and such partnerships or associations
28
29

Id.
See id. (“It is left to local legislatures within each state to grant power to its courts to exercise

specific personal jurisdiction through long-arm statutes.”).
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
Id. at 68–69.
See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 70 ( “Analysis under the due process long-arm and constitutional long-arm is

identical.”).
Id. at 69.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (2018).

36
37
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amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not contrary
to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United
States. 38
By having a due process long-arm statute, states reduce the two-step
analysis of long-arm statutes into a single step because the due process
analysis operates under these statutes as required by a constitutional
analysis. 39 Like long-arm statutes, even if the non-resident defendant has
contacts with the forum state, the defendant can establish that jurisdiction is
unreasonable by showing it violates notions of fair play and substantial
justice. 40 To determine if a defendant has made this showing, courts analyze
five factors, including the litigation’s burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s
interest in the litigation, the forum state’s interest in the claim, an efficient
resolution to the issues resulting from the claim, and the maintenance of
interstate social policies. 41
Like California and Rhode Island, Minnesota exercises specific
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants through a long-arm
statute. 42 Minnesota’s statute states that:
As to the cause of arising from any acts enumerated in this
subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the
subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, or the
individual’s personal representative, in the same manner as
if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a
resident of this state. This section applies if, in person or
through an agent, the foreign corporation or nonresident
individual: (1) owns, uses or possesses any real property
situated in this state; or (2) transacts any business within the
state . . . . 43
Unlike California or Rhode Island, Minnesota exercises specific
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants through a laundry-list
long-arm statute with enumerated acts. 44 However, even though Minnesota
exercises jurisdiction over non-resident defendants through a laundry-list
38
39

9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (2018).

See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 70 (“Analysis under the due process

long-arm and constitutional long-arm is identical.”).
40
41
42

Id.
Id.
See MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subdiv. 1 (2018) (stating that Minnesota’s long-arm statute

operates through a list of enumerated acts and under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
43
44

Id.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (2018) (stating California’s due process long-arm

statute without listing enumerated acts); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (2018) (stating
Rhode Island’s due process long-arm statute without listing enumerated acts).
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long-arm statute, due process concerns still apply. 45 Accordingly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the state’s long-arm statute allows
Minnesota courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction only as far as the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows. 46 Furthermore,
the Minnesota Supreme Court applies federal case law to analyze the longarm statute because federal decisions govern the statute’s federal questions. 47
Thus, this mandate requires a history of federal case law’s analysis of specific
personal jurisdiction and long-arm statutes before Minnesota’s analysis
begins. 48

B.

Evolution of the Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine

The applicable federal law concerning specific personal jurisdiction
begins with Pennoyer v. Neff. 49 In Pennoyer, the claim involved a suit against
a non-resident defendant who was not personally served with process. 50
Instead, the plaintiff used constructive service through publication, and the
defendant did not appear in court to defend the lawsuit. 51 Accordingly, the
court issued a default judgment, and a sheriff seized and sold the
See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 70 (“Even if the defendant’s activities
satisfy the long-arm statute, it is still possible that exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant nevertheless will fail because of a due process violation.”).
Valaspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1992).
Id. at 411; see also Atkinson v. U.S. Operating Co., 129 Minn. 232, 233, 152 N.W. 410,
410 (1915) (“we simply apply federal case law” when examining Minnesota’s long-arm
statute).
45

46
47

48

See id.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 715 (1877). This case marked the advent of personal
jurisdiction within the common law and remained the controlling authority regarding
personal jurisdiction doctrine prior to International Shoe. Id. at 733–34. Pennoyer held, to
establish personal jurisdiction, a defendant “must be brought within its jurisdiction by services
of process within the State, or by [the defendant’s] . . . voluntary appearance.” Id. at 733.
Beyond the caselaw, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) are also central to the
development of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence as they “govern civil proceedings in
United States district courts.” Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, U.S. FED. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civilprocedure [https://perma.cc/8Y3X-VPPJ]. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 authorized the
Supreme Court to create the FRCP. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077. “[T]he rulemaking
process was [then] delegated by the Court to committees of the Judicial Conference, the
policy-making body of the U.S. Courts.” How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. FED.
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemakingprocess-works [https://perma.cc/7YL2-LXQJ]. Presently, committees of the Judicial
Conference engage in an ongoing analysis of the function and impact of the federal rules. Id.
As a result of this ongoing analysis, a committee may decide to propose a change to the rules,
which invokes several review steps before submission to the Supreme Court for
consideration and approval of any recommended changes. Id. Today, the process for
challenging personal jurisdiction is codified under the FRCP. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 716–17.
49

50
51

Id.
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defendant’s land to satisfy the judgement. 52 The defendant appealed the
decision. 53
Pennoyer determined that service of process solely provided
through publication offended principles of due process. 54 In its analysis, the
Court reasoned that “[p]rocess from the tribunals of one State cannot run
into another State, and summon a party there domiciled to respond to
proceedings against him.” 55 Like processes sent to defendants out of state,
processes published in periodicals cannot establish personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant and do not create an obligation for the
defendant to appear in court. 56 Instead, service of process alongside
publication, or the defendant’s voluntary appearance within the forum state,
create personal jurisdiction under a due process analysis. 57
Present-day personal jurisdiction jurisprudence stems from the
decision in International Shoe Company v. State of Washington. 58 There,
the defendant, International Shoe Company, was a Delaware company with
an office in St. Louis, Missouri. 59 At issue in the case was the company’s use
of salespeople in Washington. 60 International Shoe used salespeople in
Washington by shipping products to them, having them display and sell
those products, and then compensating them with a commission for the sale
of those products. 61 In addition, International Shoe reimbursed its
Washington salespeople for renting offices and storefronts in the state. 62
Washington sued International Shoe for its failure to contribute to an
unemployment fund as required by Washington statute. 63
The holding of International Shoe established the beginning of the
minimum contacts test, which requires certain minimum contacts between
the defendant and the forum state to maintain a suit. 64 The notion behind
the test contends that so long as the defendant-corporation has minimum
contacts with the forum state, a court can properly exercise personal
Id. at 719. Pennoyer determined that service of process solely provided through publication
(such as newspaper ads) offended principles of due process.
Id. at 715.
See id. at 714 (“A personal judgment is without any validity, if it be rendered by a State
court in an action upon a money-demand against a non-resident of the State, who was served
by publication of summons, but upon whom no personal service of process within the State
was made, and who did not appear . . . .”).
Id. at 715.
52

53
54

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id.
Id.

Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 68.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945).

Id.
Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 311.
See Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 69.
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jurisdiction without upsetting the “traditional concepts of fair play and
substantial justice.” 65
Furthermore, the Court held that International Shoe received legal
benefits and protections from Washington, and could have relied upon
Washington’s courts if it needed to enforce a right through legal action. 66
The Court began its minimum contacts analysis by recognizing that
presence within a state for jurisdictional purposes had been established by
continuous and systematic contact. 67 However, the Court also conceded that
a corporate agent’s presence within the state and isolated activity by those
agents is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction over a corporation. 68
In these instances, litigation outside the corporation’s home state would be
unreasonably burdensome and costly, thus breaking with due process. 69
Second, the Court indicated that when a corporation avails itself of the
privileges and legal benefits within a state, service of process over this
corporation complies with due process. 70 Therefore, service of process to
International Shoe was proper because it sought the protections of
Washington’s laws. Furthermore, the operations of its salespeople created
sufficient contacts with Washington to comply with due process notions of
fair play and substantial justice. 71
In subsequent decisions, “the court essentially took the position that
so long as the chosen forum was an arguably sensible place to litigate, given
the connection between the forum and the parties . . . jurisdiction would be
valid.” 72 In McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, the Court
considered whether the residence of one party to a business contract in a
forum state created jurisdiction over the other non-resident party to that
contract. 73 Here, a California resident, the plaintiff, bought life insurance
from Empire Mutual Insurance Company, an Arizona business. 74
International Life Insurance Co., the defendant, later acquired the contract
from Empire Mutual Insurance. 75 The California resident paid his
65
66

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
See id. (indicating International Shoe “received the benefits and protection of the laws of

the state, including the right to resort to the courts for enforcement of its rights”).
Id. at 317.
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id.
Id.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 72–73; see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 220

(1957) (holding that exercising personal jurisdiction over an insurance company
incorporated in Texas was appropriate because the life insurance company refused to pay
out a policy to a deceased resident of California after it specifically targeted the forum state
and solicited business from the resident there).
McGee, 355 U.S. at 220.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
73
74
75
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premiums from his home in California to International Life Insurance’s
offices in Texas by mail. 76 When the contract’s payment came into effect,
International Life Insurance refused to pay the California resident. 77
In its holding, the Court stated that if the forum state’s contacts arise
from a contract with a substantial connection to that state, due process is
validated. 78 Therefore, exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant
company incorporated in another state was appropriate because California
“ha[d] a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its
residents when their insurers refuse[d] to pay claims. These residents would
be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance
company to a distant State to hold it legally accountable.” 79 The Court found
a substantial connection to the forum state through the premiums mailed
from California, the contract’s enactment in California, and the resident’s
death in California. 80 Thus, these activities created the minimum contacts
required with the forum state and did not offend due process. 81
However, the Court limited this expansion in Hanson v. Denckla. 82
In Hanson, the Florida court considered a situation similar to McGee in
that the claim involved acquiring jurisdiction over a trust execution that
originated in Delaware. 83After executing a trust in Delaware, a woman then
executed a will in Florida involving the trust before dying there. 84 The
Florida Supreme Court held that the court’s jurisdiction covered the
trustees, who were the non- residents. 85 However, a Delaware court claimed
that the Florida court did not have jurisdiction over the non-residents. 86
The Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware court’s decision. 87 In
their holding, the Justices stated that a court could not require defendants
to defend a claim unless they have both minimal contacts with the forum
state and the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the forum state
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 222.
See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (stating that a defendant cannot be required

to defend itself in a different state unless the defendant has minimal contacts with that state
and the defendant purposefully availed itself to the state’s privileges by conducting activities
in the forum state).
Compare McGee, 355 U.S. at 221 (handling an insurance sale that transpired in California
between a California resident and an Arizona company that later sold the account to a Texas
Company), with Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238 (implicating a probate dispute over a trust that was
executed in Delaware but subject to a will sworn out in Florida after the testator moved there).
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 240.
Id. at 238.
83

84
85
86
87

Id.
Id. at 256.
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by accepting the benefits of the forum state’s legal protections. 88 The Court
determined the Florida court erred in its decision because “[t]he settlor’s
execution in Florida of her power of appointment cannot remedy the
absence of such an act in this case.” 89 Furthermore, Florida did not acquire
jurisdiction over the non-resident party solely by being the “center of gravity”
for the claim and the most convenient location for litigation. 90
Subsequently, the Court further explained its definition of
“minimum contacts” in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 91 The
Court held that personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant requires
contacts between the defendant and the forum state that are not
happenstance. 92 The plaintiffs, two automobile drivers who were New York
residents, were hurt in a car accident in Oklahoma during a road trip. 93 They
then filed a claim in Oklahoma state court against World-Wide Volkswagen
Corporation, a car distributor and retailer that was incorporated and had a
principal place of business in New York. 94
The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen recognized that
International Shoe “gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
liable.” 95 The predictability outlined in International Shoe allows a
corporation that “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State . . . [to have] clear notice that it is subject to
suit there, and [] act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation.” 96
However, the Court did not endorse the notion that the mere
predictability of a vehicle traveling to another state should render a motorvehicle dealership or manufacturer subject to personal jurisdiction in a
foreign-state to which that vehicle traveled. 97 Rather, the decision in WorldWide Volkswagen represented the evolution of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence requiring contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state
constituting more than mere collateral financial benefits. 98 So, while it may
See id. at 253 (“[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”).
Id. at 254.

88

89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 297.
Id.; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–99 (“But there is no such or similar basis for

Oklahoma jurisdiction . . . [t]here is no evidence of record that any automobiles distributed
by World-Wide are sold to retail customers outside this tristate area.”).
Id. at 299.
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be foreseeable that a vehicle purchased from World-Wide Volkswagen
might end up in Oklahoma, foreseeability alone is insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 99
The Court has reinforced the idea that a defendant must have
minimum contacts with the forum state in other cases. For specific
jurisdiction, the Court established that a defendant’s general connections
with a forum state is insufficient. 100 Rather, the controversy must arise from,
or relate to, a defendant’s contacts with a forum state and the controversy
must produce a substantial connection between the defendant and forum
state. 101 Also, the Court has held that specific personal jurisdiction does not
exist when the suit lacks a connection between the forum state and the main
controversy, even if the defendant conducts business in the state
unconnected to the controversy within the State. 102 Likewise, the Court held
that mere injury to a forum state does not establish personal jurisdiction, 103
nor does the mere presence of a chattel in the forum state establish personal
jurisdiction over the chattel’s owner. 104 To denote this connection, the Court
applied a standard mandating that conduct gives rise to or relates to the
claim. 105
The World-Wide Volkswagen holding reemerged in the plurality
opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California. 106 Asahi
was a case involving arguably stronger contacts than World-Wide
Volkswagen because the non-resident had actual knowledge, or should have
had actual knowledge, that at least some of its component products were
being directly sold to the forum state of California. 107 Asahi had two holdings,
a plurality opinion and a majority opinion. 108 The plurality opinion did not
believe actual knowledge of a product’s entrance into the stream of
commerce in a specific state sufficed to create personal jurisdiction, but
would require evidence that the non-resident defendant advertised in the
99
100
101

Id. at 295.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).

See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (stating

that specific personal jurisdiction must arise from the defendant’s conduct with the forum);
see also Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (mandating the existence of a substantial
connection between the forum state and defendant’s suit-related conduct for personal
jurisdiction).
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (stating
sales within a forum state does not grant personal jurisdiction over an unrelated controversy).
Walden, 571 U.S. at 290.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980).
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414–16.
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
Id.; see also Pfeffer, supra note 11 at 99–100; see generally World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 297–99.
Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 99–101.
102

103
104
105

106
107
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forum state or designed the product for the forum state. 109 The majority
opinion in Asahi held that “even if minimum contacts existed in . . . [Asahi],
it would be unreasonable to allow California to exercise jurisdiction.” 110
Asahi represents an additional evolution in personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence regarding non-resident defendants. Foreseeable minimum
sufficient contacts must exist with the forum state, and the contacts must
constitute purposeful direction toward the forum state in the form of specific
advertising or product development targeting that specific state. 111
Additionally, courts still perform an analysis as to the fairness of defending
a claim in the forum in question. 112
In modern long-arm statute cases, the Court has analyzed whether
a product’s entrance into a forum’s stream of commerce satisfies the analysis
required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. For
example, in J. McIntyre Machine, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the United States
Supreme Court discussed whether New Jersey’s exercise of jurisdiction
violated due process. 113 There, the in-state resident injured his hand in a
metal-shearing machine produced in England by J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd., a company incorporated and operated in England. 114 At no time did
petitioner engage in any activities in New Jersey that revealed an intent to
invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws. 115 The evolution of personal
jurisdiction under McIntyre reaffirms the requirement that contacts be
specifically targeted to the forum state, thus availing the party of its
jurisdiction. 116 The Court found that the New Jersey Supreme Court violated
J. McIntyre Machinery’s due process because the company, in using a
United States distributor, did not expect its products to be purchased by
residents of the forum state. 117 However, if J. McIntyre Machinery had
expected this outcome, then the exercise would have complied with due

109
110
111
112
113

Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 103–04; see also Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 99–100.
Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 108; see also Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 100.
Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 100.
Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 102.
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); see generally Asahi Metal, 480

U.S. at 102; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–99 (1980).
McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878.
Id. at 887; Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 115–17.
See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882 (“[T]ransmission of goods permits the exercise of
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general
rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the
forum State.”); Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 335–36 (Minn. 2016)
(concluding MoneyMutual targeted Minnesota through television advertisements and the use
of internet Google AdWords advertisements).
McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 886.
114
115
116

117
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process because the products would have entered the forum’s stream of
commerce at the company’s direction, constituting purposeful ailment. 118
The most recent case to take center stage in the evolving
jurisprudence of specific personal jurisdiction is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Superior Court, where the Court held that specific personal jurisdiction
over claims brought by a non-resident plaintiff was improper. 119 Under
Bristol-Myers Squibb, there must also be an affiliation between the forum
state and the specific underlying claim at issue to support personal
jurisdiction. 120 Bristol-Myers Squibb did not mention whether its holding
would impact properly certified class action claims, but the majority stated
the “decision does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from
joining together in a consolidated action in the States that have general
jurisdiction over [Bristol-Myers Squibb].” 121
With these cases in mind, the United States Supreme Court
produced an analysis of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
through a factor-based test. 122 If the factors weigh in the defendant’s favor,
then the forum’s exercise of jurisdiction does not comply with the Due
Process Clause. 123 The Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the same test
when analyzing due process and long-arm statutes. 124

C.

Minnesota’s Adherence to Federal Due Process Standards

While Minnesota’s long-arm statute is of the laundry-list variety,
due process analysis still applies to the statute once a claim meets the activity
criteria. 125 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that Minnesota’s longarm statute extends Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction only “as far as the Due
Process Clause of the federal constitution allows.” 126 Furthermore, “when
See id. at 881–82 (“This Court has stated that a defendant’s placing goods into the stream
of commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State’ may indicate purposeful ailment.”).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1733, 1776 (2017).
Id. at 1776–77.
Id. at 1783; see also Joan R. Camagong, Applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to Class Actions,
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/productsliability/practice/2019/applying-bristol-myers-squibb-to-class-actions/
[https://perma.cc/9HS8-6M6Y].
See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 70 (“Analysis under the due process
long-arm and constitutional long-arm is identical.”).
118

119
120
121

122

123
124

Id.
See Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn. 2019) (listing the five factors

that a Minnesota court must find to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a company
not in personam).
See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 70 (stating even if the defendant’s
activities satisfy the long-arm statute, it is still possible that exercising jurisdiction over the
non-resident defendant will nevertheless fail because of a due process violation).
Valaspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1992).

125

126
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analyzing most personal jurisdiction questions, Minnesota courts may
simply apply the federal case law.” 127
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently interpreted the
aforementioned United States Supreme Court holdings in Rilley v.
MoneyMutual, LLC. 128 First, the Minnesota Supreme Court established five
factors for the defendant that include “(1) the quantity of contacts with the
forum state; (2) the nature and quality of contacts; (3) the connection of the
cause of action with these contacts; (4) the interest of the state providing a
forum; and (5) the convenience of all the parties.” 129 Courts use these factors
to decide whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state
and if its contacts sufficiently relate to the cause of action. 130 Second, when
considering sufficient minimum contacts, the Rilley holding mandates that
a court consider all of the defendant’s alleged contacts together, and not
individually, through the totality of the circumstances. 131 Finally, in Juliech v.
Yamazki Maka Optonics Corp, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that
the first three factors determine whether “minimum contacts” exist. 132
III.

A.

THE BANDEMER DECISION

Factual and Procedural History

In January 2015, Minnesota resident Adam Bandemer rode as a
passenger in Eric Hanson’s 1994 Ford Crown Victoria on a Minnesota
road. 133 Hanson, the driver, rear-ended a snowplow, causing the car to enter
a ditch. 134 As a result of this crash, Bandemer allegedly suffered a severe
brain injury due to the passenger-side airbag’s failure to deploy. 135 Bandemer
also alleged that a manufacturing defect caused the vehicle’s airbag’s
failure. 136
Bandemer “filed a complaint in district court alleging products
liability, negligence, and breach of warranty claims against Ford.” 137
Subsequently, Ford moved to dismiss the claim for lack of personal
jurisdiction because the used car involved in the accident was neither
127

Id. at 411.

Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 321 (Minn. 2016).
Id. at 328 (quoting Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 570
(Minn. 2004)).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 337.
Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 568.
Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 2019).
Id.

128
129

130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Id.
Id. Bandemer also named Hanson and Hanson’s father as defendants in a negligence
claim that lies outside the scope of this Paper. Id.

135
136
137
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designed, manufactured, nor originally sold in Minnesota. 138 However, Ford
did not dispute the quantity of its contacts with Minnesota or the
reasonableness of personal jurisdiction. 139
Ford moved for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction,
but Minnesota courts believed Ford had sufficient contacts with Minnesota,
through its business practices, including advertising, sales, and data
collection. 140 First, Ford sold more than two thousand 1994 Crown Victorias
to Minnesotan dealerships and about two hundred thousand vehicles in
total between 2013 and 2015. 141 Second, various Ford advertising campaigns
contacted Minnesotans through various mediums, including direct mail
advertisements coupled with contacts relating to Ford’s national advertising
campaigns. 142 Ford’s marketing efforts also included a 2016 “Ford
Experience Tour” in Minnesota, a 1966 Ford Mustang designed for the
Minnesota Vikings, a “Ford Driving Skills for Life Free National Teen
Driver Training Camp” held in Minnesota, and sponsorship of Minnesota
athletic events. 143 Third, Ford collected data from its Minnesotan dealerships
to further both redesigns and repairs. 144 Finally, Ford has employees,
mechanics, service agents, franchises, and real property in Minnesota. 145
Initially, Ford’s registered agent for service of process received
certified mail containing notice of the lawsuit, but certified mail is an
improper form of service under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. 146
Ford alleged defective service in its answer, but subsequently moved for
voluntary transfer of venue to Todd County, Minnesota, the county in which
the Hansons resided. 147 Plaintiff then properly served “the summons and
complaint on Ford Motor Company by process server delivering a copy of
the summons and complaint to its registered agent for service.” 148
The motion then proceeded through the district court, appellate
court, and eventually to the Minnesota Supreme Court. 149 The district court
held that personal jurisdiction was appropriate. 150 However, Ford

138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., No. 77-CV-16-1025, 2017 WL 10185684, at *1
(Minn. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2017); see also MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(c).
Bandemer, 2017 WL 10185684, at *1.
146

147
148
149
150

Id.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748–49.
Id. at 748.
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appealed. 151 Applying Rilley v. MoneyMutual, 152 the Minnesota Court of
Appeals determined the district court did not err in its denial of Ford’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 153 The court reasoned
that Ford’s marketing efforts in Minnesota formed a substantial connection
between Ford, Minnesota, and the litigation. 154 Thus, Ford purposefully
availed itself of Minnesota law, and Ford’s contacts were sufficiently related
to the alleged brain damage suffered from the alleged defect in the 1994
Crown Victoria’s airbags. 155 Furthermore, the court rejected Ford’s
argument that Supreme Court precedent now requires a more direct
connection between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation than the
standard for connection stated in Rilley. 156 Thereafter, Ford appealed to the
Minnesota Supreme Court. 157

B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals,
concluding “Ford’s contacts alone [were] sufficient to support specific
personal jurisdiction.” 158 First, the court stated the standard for Minnesota’s
long-arm statute which “prevents personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant if it would ‘violate fairness and substantial justice.’” 159 Then, as it
had in Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 160 the court stated that
Minnesota’s long-arm statute grants Minnesota courts personal jurisdiction
only within the limits of the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. 161 Additionally, section 543.19 of the Minnesota Statutes states
that exercising personal jurisdiction is improper if it “offends traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 162 Yet, a state attempting to exert
personal jurisdiction “‘does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be

151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id.

884 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2016).

Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 715.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 749 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subdiv. 1(4)(ii) (2018)).
495 N.W.2d 408, 410–11 (Minn. 1992).

Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749.
Id. at 749 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see generally

MINN. STAT. § 542.19, subdiv. 1(4)(ii) (2020).
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purchased by consumers in the forum State’ and those products
subsequently injure forum consumers.” 163
To determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Ford
would comport with federal due process, the court analyzed five factors. 164
These factors included (1) the quantity of Ford’s contacts with Minnesota,
(2) the nature and quality of Ford’s contacts, (3) the connection of Ford’s
contacts with Bandemer’s the cause of action—his brain injury resulting from
the Crown Victoria’s defect, (4) Minnesota’s interest in the litigation, and (5)
the convenience for Ford and Bandemer. 165 Through these factors the
Minnesota Supreme Court sought to examine “reasonableness in light of
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 166 The court then
divided the first three factors into one category for a minimum contacts
analysis. 167 It then used the last two factors to test for reasonableness, fair
play, and substantial justice. 168
Through an analysis of the first two factors, the court determined
that the court of appeals did not err when it held that the quality and quantity
of contacts between Ford and Minnesota satisfied the requirements for
personal jurisdiction. 169 The court relied on Ford’s marketing and data
collection in Minnesota, which demonstrated that Ford placed its vehicles
within Minnesota’s stream of commerce with the intent that Minnesotans
would purchase them. 170 Furthermore, Ford collected data about sales at
Minnesotan dealerships, sold more than two thousand 1994 Crown
Victorias in Minnesota alongside two hundred thousand other vehicles, and
conducted directed marketing in the state. 171 Thus, the court found that the
suit’s connection with Minnesota surpassed “the mere unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant” because
Ford targeted its sales at Minnesotans. 172 Hence, Ford availed itself of
Minnesota. 173
In an analysis of the connection between the cause of action and
Ford’s contacts with Minnesota, the court determined the exercise of
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749, 759 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 473 (1985)). States cannot exercise personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause
unless the defendant has minimum contacts with that state and the suit comports with justice
and fair play. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749.
See id. (listing the five factors that require examination to determine if an exercise of
personal jurisdiction complies with federal due process).
163

164
165

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 750–51.
Id. at 751.
Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)).
Id.

1182

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

personal jurisdiction was proper. 174 The court repeated its analysis from
Rilley, 175 which stated that defendants solicited Minnesotans to purchase
goods through targeted ads. 176 Therefore, like the ads in Riley, Ford’s
marketing constituted a relevant contact with Minnesota for the minimum
contacts analysis. 177
To support this analysis, the court maintained that replacing the
“relating to” 178 standard with Ford’s “giving rise to” standard would create an
unwarranted shift in specific personal jurisdiction law. 179 The court rejected
Ford’s argument that Bristol-Myers Squibb mandates a “giving rise to”
standard because (1) it interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s
language as buttressing the “relating to” standard, 180 and (2) the Bristol-Myers
Squibb Court determined there were no connections between foreign
plaintiffs and the forum state. 181 Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme
Court determined that the United States Supreme Court consistently
applied a “relating to” standard in International Shoe because it held
Washington State’s tax enforcement was sufficiently connected to
International Shoe’s presence in Washington to create personal
jurisdiction. 182 Furthermore, while the World-Wide Volkswagen Court
found the foreseeability that a car might travel to Oklahoma failed to
establish personal jurisdiction, 183 the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
if Volkswagen had advertised, sold, and collected data in Oklahoma, as
Ford had in Minnesota, then the United States Supreme Court would have
found personal jurisdiction. 184 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court retained
the “relating to” standard, finding Minnesota had personal jurisdiction over
Ford. 185

174

Id. at 755.

Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 336–37 (Minn. 2016).
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 751 (discussing how MoneyMutual’s solicitation of
Minnesotans to apply for unlawful loans allowed a suit to survive dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction).

175
176

Id.
Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 337.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752.
Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781
(2017)). In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Court held “[o]ur settled principles regarding specific

177
178
179
180

jurisdiction control this case.” 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752 (citing Bristol-Meyers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 178).
Id. at 753 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 753 (declining to adopt Ford’s rule that if a “particular
vehicle was not designed, manufactured, or sold in Oklahoma . . . then it would not have
mattered if the defendant sold millions of cars in Oklahoma.”).
181
182
183
184

185

Id.
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Next, the court determined that the facts met due process
requirements because Ford’s contacts related to Bandemer’s claim. 186
Rejecting Ford’s claim that no tortious conduct of design, manufacturing,
warrantying, or warning about the 1994 Crown Victoria occurred in
Minnesota, the court determining that Ford’s targeted advertising and sales
meant this specific Crown Victoria did not randomly arrive in Minnesota. 187
Bandemer’s allegations that Ford failed to detect the defect related to
Minnesota because Ford collected data from Minnesotans about their
vehicle purchases and targeted Minnesotans with advertisements. 188
Furthermore, the car crash occurred in Minnesota, its owner registered the
vehicle in Minnesota, and Bandemer’s injuries were treated in Minnesota. 189
Therefore, as in Rilley, 190 the court found the totality of the Bandemer’s
allegations supported personal jurisdiction. 191
Finally, the court determined that the facts supported the
reasonableness of Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction and comported with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 192 The court
established that Minnesota had a strong interest in adjudication because the
accident involved a Minnesota county vehicle on a Minnesota road. 193
Furthermore, the dispute involved a Minnesota resident and a business that
regularly transacted in Minnesota. 194 Also, Minnesota had an interest in
governing its roads. 195 Next, Minnesota offered a convenient forum, as it was
the location for Bandemer’s accident and treatment. 196 Finally, even “Ford
concede[d] that these factors [were] established,” and, as the court
explained, “Minnesota ha[d] a strong interest in adjudicating this dispute
regarding an accident . . . between a Minnesota resident as plaintiff and both
Ford—a corporation that does business regularly in Minnesota—and two
Minnesota residents as defendants.” 197
However, two justices dissented because they deemed Ford’s
connections to the forum state and the cause of action to be unrelated and
violative of due process. 198 The justices disagreed for several reasons. 199 First,
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Id.
Id.
Id. at 754.
Id.

Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 337 (Minn. 2016).
Bandamer, 931 N.W.2d at 755.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 756 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 756–61.
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they found that the Crown Victoria entered Minnesota by chance, as it was
designed in Michigan, assembled in Canada, and sold by Ford in a
Bismarck, North Dakota dealership in 1994. 200 The car entered Minnesota
in 2011 by way of its fourth owner, and the accident occurred during the
car’s fifth ownership, which started in 2013. 201 Second, the dissent noted that
Ford dealerships in Minnesota are independently owned. 202 Third, they
argued that Ford engaged in national advertising that merely included
Minnesota, rather than advertising that directly targeted Minnesotans. 203
Furthermore, the dissent noted that no recent advertisements included a
1994 Crown Victoria. 204 Fifth, the dissent distinguished Rilley from the
instant case by stating the loan company both solicited services from
Minnesotans and violated Minnesota consumer protection laws in the ads,
while Ford’s marketing did not mention a Crown Victoria or its airbags. 205
Sixth, the dissent argued that injury to a forum resident alone is not sufficient
to form a connection with the forum, so personal jurisdiction did not apply
to Ford purely because of Bandemer’s accident. 206 Accordingly, the dissent
found a lack of personal jurisdiction. 207
However, the majority quickly distinguished this argument from the
facts and held that the present case involved facts sufficiently connecting the
non-resident defendant to the alleged injury in the forum state. 208
Conversely, in Bristol-Myers Squibb, “[t]he Supreme Court held that
California did not have personal jurisdiction over the company regarding
claims by out-of-state . . . plaintiffs because no connection existed between
those out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims and the defendant’s contacts with
California.” 209 As a result, the court affirmed the court of appeals decision,
determining personal jurisdiction was properly exercised. 210

200
201
202
203

Id. at 757–58.
Id. at 758.
Id.
See id. (listing national advertising and direct mail, “which may reach the Minnesota

market,” alongside online data collections that any American could as untargeted strategies).
Id. at 760.
Id. (distinguishing Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 2016)).
Id. at 762 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980)).
See id. (stating that the defendant’s contacts with the forum were what mattered, and that
the majority did not establish that Ford’s contacts with Minnesota related to Bandemer’s
allegations).
Id. at 752 (majority opinion).
Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–
82 (2017)).
See id. at 755.
204
205
206
207
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209
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Quick Note on Ford’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

The United States Supreme Court granted Ford’s petition for a writ
of certiorari, and oral arguments were held on October 7, 2020. 211 Ford, in
its brief, argued for the adoption of a causal relationship standard for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. 212 In contrast, Bandemer posited that
adopting Ford’s proposition would transition personal jurisdictional analysis
into something more akin to tort law’s proximate cause standard. 213The
following analysis sections contain two opposing arguments written by the
separate authors. The first analysis argues the Minnesota Supreme Court
correctly decided Bandemer, while the second analysis argues the
Bandemer decision was made in error.
IV. THE ARGUMENT SUPPORTING THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 214

A.

The Bandemer Decision: A Five-Factor Analysis

The Bandemer decision correctly upheld the minimum contacts
and due process analysis necessary for Minnesota to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction. 215 The minimum contacts analysis includes: “(1) the
quantity of contacts with the forum state; (2) the nature and quality of those
contacts; (3) the connection of the cause of action with these contacts; (4)
the interest of the state providing a forum; and (5) the convenience of the
parties.” 216 The factors themselves are not individually determinative, rather
the defendant’s contacts are considered in aggregate “by looking at the
totality of the circumstances.” 217 Furthermore, “the first three factors
determine whether Ford has sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with Minnesota,
Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/ford-motor-company-v-bandemer/ [https://perma.cc/B9EX-J2KE]; see also Ford
Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, OYEZ (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-368 [https://perma.cc/2LDL-YY98]; Oral Argument:
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, SCOTUS (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2020/19-368
[https://perma.cc/XMN5-YLKA].
Brief for Petitioner at 15, Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (Nos. 19-368 &
19-369), 2020 WL 1154744, at *15.
Brief for Respondents at 10–12, Ford Motor Company v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 140 S. Ct. 917 (2020) (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 1531238, at *10–12; see
also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212.
This section of the analysis is authored exclusively by John-Paul Dees.
See supra Section III.B (discussing the five factors Minnesota courts use to determine if
specific personal jurisdiction is present).
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749.
Id. at 750 (citing Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 337 (Minn. 2016)).
211

212

213

214
215

216
217
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and the last two factors determine whether jurisdiction is otherwise
‘reasonable’ under concepts of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” 218

1.

Quality, Nature, and Quantity of Contacts

In Bandemer, Ford did not dispute the first and second factors of
the minimum contacts test as relating to the “quality or quantity of [Ford’s]
contacts with Minnesota.” 219 Ford’s use of regional advertising and marketing
activities in Minnesota established “contacts that were not ‘random,
fortuitous, or attenuated’” resulting in Ford’s purposeful availment of
Minnesota law. 220
Although Ford does not dispute the nature or quality of its contacts
with Minnesota, 221 it is important to consider the significance advertisements
and the age of internet commerce play in a minimum contacts analysis. 222 In
Asahi’s plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that “placing a product
into the stream of commerce was not enough unless coupled with some
other act.” 223 O’Connor suggested that an example of an additional act could
include “designing the product for the market . . . , advertising in the forum
state, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers . . . ,
or marketing the product through a distributor . . . in the forum state.” 224
The significance of advertisements in establishing a connection to a
forum state for specific personal jurisdiction is underutilized by legal teams.
In Rilley v. MoneyMutual, the Minnesota Supreme Court, held that the
purchase of Internet advertisements through the Google AdWords
platform by MoneyMutual was a means to establish a significant connection

Id. at 749 (quoting Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 570
(Minn. 2004)).
Id. at 750–52 (stating that Ford’s contacts with Minnesota were sufficient for specific
personal jurisdiction because “Ford’s data collection, marketing, and advertising in
Minnesota demonstrate that it delivered its product into the stream of commerce with the
intention that Minnesotans purchase such vehicles.”).
Id. at 750 (quoting Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 913 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. Ct. App.
2018) (citation omitted)).
See id. at 748.
See generally Scott M. Hagel, Civil Procedure – The Stream of Commerce Theory in
Minnesota: Does the Shoe Fit?, 24 WM. MICHELL L. REV. 231 (1998) (discussing stream of
commerce theory decisions and their influence on decisions involving personal jurisdiction
in Minnesota); Brian X. Chen, I Downloaded the Information That Facebook Has on Me.
Yikes.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
11,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/personaltech/i-downloaded-theinformation-that-facebook-has-on-me-yikes.html [https://perma.cc/2XUK-V5YA].
See Hagel, supra note 222, at 237–38 (1998) (discussing Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).
See id. at 238.
218

219

220

221
222
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with Minnesota. 225 If anything, the judiciary underestimates the significance
of corporations utilizing data-mined information from private individuals to
tailor advertisements specifically to citizens of various states in an attempt to
encourage individuals to purchase goods. 226 As a result of modern
technology, corporations can utilize geo-fencing advertisements, a practice
that forwards or triggers an advertisement to an individual on a smartphone
alerting him or her of a particular offer, or company, based on radio
frequency identification, Wi-Fi, GPS location, or cellular data. 227 Courts
should maintain a strong presumption favoring the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over non-resident corporations that advertise online because
these corporations use this consumer data to guide business decisions
relating to that forum. 228
As a general matter, Ford offers a rewards program called
“FordPass,” which enables Ford to collect an individual’s private
Rilley v. MoneyMutual, 884 N.W.2d 321, 336–39 (Minn. 2016). Google Ads is a platform
that enables businesses to advertise business goods or services by paying for promotion in
the form of search result appearances that coincide with certain predetermined search
parameters. See Google Ads, How It Works, GOOGLE, https://ads.google.com/home/ howit-works/?subid=us-en-ha-awa-bk-c-co!o3~EAIaIQobChMIkoHrldd7AIVBL7Ach17PQqq
EAAYASAAEgIBGvD_BwE~76351050606~kwd12340353~6466339383~445804224654 [https://perma.cc/F9LW-AKGP].
See Chen, supra note 222; Jake Frankenfield, Data Analytics, INVESTOPEDIA (July 1, 2020)
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/data-analytics.asp [https://perma.cc/EDW6-HSYV]
(defining data analytics as “the science of analyzing raw data to make conclusions about that
information. Many of the techniques and processes of data analytics have been automated
into mechanical processes and algorithms that work over raw data for human
consumption.”); Alexandra Twin, Data Mining, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ terms/d/datamining.asp [https://perma.cc/AKW5-K7AL]
(describing the use of free customer loyalty cards that enable stores to easily track an
individual’s spending habits to specifically tailor coupons to the individual encouraging
additional consumption); Andrew Olton, Data Science Case Study: Optimizing Product
Placement in Retail (Part 1), TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (May 28, 2018),
https://towardsdatascience.com/data-science-case-study-optimizing-product-placement-inretail-part-1-2e8b27e16e8d [https://perma.cc/G8AJ-SCGE] (describing the practical uses of
big data and data analytics information can provide to retail businesses); see also Terry
Turner, Data Mining, CONSUMER NOTICE (July 17, 2020), https://www.consumer
notice.org/data-protection/mining/ [https://perma.cc/PYP8-VE35] (defining “data-mining,”
as the collection of an individual’s personal information for the purpose of the selling the
information to companies to aid marketing efforts).
Amber Kemmis, What is Geofencing? Everything You Need to Know About LocationBased
Marketing,
BUS.
2
COMMUNITY
(Jan.
10,
2020),
https://www.business2community.com/ marketing/what-is-geofencing-everything-you-needto-know-about-location-based-marketing-02274287 [https://perma.cc/3GW6-YEVV]; see
also Charles Mazzini, The Five Ws (And One H) of Geofence Marketing, FORBES (Dec. 13,
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagency council/2019/12/13/the-five-ws-and-oneh-of-geofence-marketing/#2e78a3e649aa [https://perma.cc/N5AL-MFSX].
See generally supra note 226 (describing ways in which personal information gathered
through data mining may guide business decisions).
225

226
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information relating to the precise location where information is collected
from a mobile device and/or a vehicle with location-based functions. 229
Additionally, Ford collects information relating to a vehicle’s current
“location, travel direction, and speed” including deriving approximate
locations through access points such as “cell towers, . . . IP address[es],
whether location services are on or turned off, through the permission
system used by . . . [an individual’s] mobile operating system.” 230
Furthermore, Ford uses the personal information collected under the guise
of providing greater functionality and service because it enables Ford to
personalize a consumer’s “experience, troubleshoot problems, [and]
develop new and improved products, services, and marketing strategies and
research.” 231

2.

The Connection Between the Cause of Action and the Contacts

Regarding the third factor, Ford maintains, in cases like Bandemer,
that specific personal jurisdiction should be altered to make it more
predictable. 232 However, due to the pervasive and near-constant nature of
data mining conducted across the country, a tenable argument for general
personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporate defendants exists,
regardless of whether the injured party’s personal data was used. 233 These
data mining operations are pervasive to the point that they constitute
continuous business operations in whichever state they occur. 234 This
argument ultimately relies on an exchange: if Ford Corporation wants to
utilize the personal information of private individuals to assist the purported
improvement of products and aid the creation of tailored marketing
campaigns to potential customers, then Ford should reasonably expect to
FordPass Terms and Privacy Policy, FORD (Feb. 2020), https://owner.ford.com/fordpass/
fordpass-terms-and-conditions.html#two [https://perma.cc/VRD5-UZW5]; see also infra
Section VII.A–C (outlining how Ford utilizes an individual’s personal information to further
its own business operations and services).
229

230
231
232
233

See id.
See id.
See generally Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019).
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (“[A] court may assert jurisdiction

over a foreign corporation ‘to hear any and all claims against [it]’ only when the corporation's
affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render
[it] essentially at home in the forum State.’”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)); FORD, supra note 229 (describing FordPass); supra
note 226 (describing data mining practices more generally); infra Section VII.A–C (outlining
how Ford utilizes an individual’s personal information to further its own business
operations).
FORD, supra note 229; infra Section VII.A–C (outlining how Ford utilizes an individual’s
personal information to further its own business operations and services); see also supra
notes 226–27.
234
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avail itself of the forum states where Ford collects personal information from
private citizens. 235
However, it is unlikely the United States Supreme Court will
completely abandon the specific personal jurisdiction framework developed
under the progeny of International Shoe. 236 In Bristol-Myers Squibb, Justice
Alito, writing for the majority, stated that the Supreme Court’s “settled
principles regarding specific jurisdiction control . . . [the] case” and “for a
state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must aris[e] out of or
relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” 237
Maintaining this frame of reference and turning our attention to the
third factor of the minimum contact test, Ford contended that specific
personal jurisdiction would not be proper because the third factor should
supposedly require a “‘giving rise to’ standard in place of the ‘arising out of
or related to standard’” or a causal standard. 238 However, Ford’s argument
fails to account for Justice Alito’s language in Bristol-Myers Squibb,
indicating Supreme Court jurisprudence controlled the Court’s decision,
which recognized that personal jurisdiction may exist whether the requisite
ties “arises out of” or “relate[s] to” a non-resident corporate defendant’s
conduct. 239 Relying on guiding principles outlining the proper exercise of
personal jurisdiction in MoneyMutual, the Minnesota Supreme Court
ultimately found Ford’s arguments unpersuasive and held that Ford’s
advertisements constituted a sufficient “contact with the Minnesota forum
for the purpose of minimum contacts analysis.” 240

3.

Interest of the State Providing a Forum

The fourth factor was established because a “dispute regarding an
accident involving a Minnesota county vehicle that occurred on a Minnesota
road, between a Minnesota resident as plaintiff and Ford” involved
Minnesota’s “vital interest in protecting the safety of its residents, [and]
regulating the safety of its roadways.” 241 Ford argued that requiring a causal
connection to establish specific personal jurisdiction would be most
consistent with the principles of federalism. 242 Additionally, Ford stated that
“a non-causal test would allow a forum State to use a defendant’s
See generally FORD, supra note 229; see also infra Sections VII.A–C.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

235
236

237
238

Id.

Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 752–53 (Minn. 2019); see generally Bristol-

Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782; see also supra Section III.B.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81; see also infra PartV.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752.
Id. at 755.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 23.

239
240
241
242

1190

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

unconnected in-state activities as a hook to regulate the defendant’s out-ofstate activities that actually form the basis of the plaintiff’s claims.” 243 The
arguments put forward in Ford’s brief woefully understate how a causal
requirement for specific jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate
defendant would do more to undermine federalism than it would conform
with due process and any purported protections of federalism. 244
Additionally:
Due process does not require that specific jurisdiction rest
on a strict causal link between the defendant’s forum-state
contacts and the plaintiffs claims, and inventing such a
requirement provides no new benefits, whether in terms of
fairness or federalism. It would, however, generate
needless inefficiencies, jeopardize states’ well-accepted
regulatory interests, and possibly result in claims that
cannot be brought in any U.S. state. 245
Adopting a causal requirement for establishing specific personal jurisdiction
would exacerbate the financial resource disparities between individual
private plaintiffs and defendant corporations because litigation involving
these parties will almost always involve a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction as a matter of course. 246

4.

The Convenience of the Parties

Lastly, the fifth factor pertaining to the convenience of the parties is
appropriate for the Minnesota forum because it was “the site of the accident
and treatment of injury” and the United States Supreme Court “has long
recognized the States’ ‘Manifest Interest’ in providing judicial forums for
their injured citizens, preventing them from having to follow defendants to

Id. at 25.
Brief for Minnesota, Texas, thirty-seven other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4–6, Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916
(2020) (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 1875615, at *4–6 [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief
for Minnesota et al.].
Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note 17, at 1.
YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 477 (recognizing that judicial proceedings do not
work as effectively or efficiently for poor litigants and with coin flip claims many litigants
could face a David battling Goliath situation); cf. Brief of Respondents at 10–12, Ford Motor
Company v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (2020) (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 1531238,
at *10–12 (indicating that if the causal standard were adopted and a widget manufactured by
a non-resident defendant corporation caused an injury, the onus would fall upon the injured
party to spend time and resources to identify the state of first-sale); Brief for Civil Procedure
Professors, supra note 17, at 2 (describing the detrimental impact of a disruptive and
inefficient causal test, which may break single disputes up across multiple state courts).
243
244

245
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distant locals.” 247 Additionally, in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, and
the rapid adoption of technology within various adjudicatory proceedings
for the observation of social distancing practices, it becomes increasingly
apparent that remote proceedings are not only feasible, but desirable in
many circumstances. 248 Non-resident defendant corporations should no
longer be able to escape liability by arguing that defending a case in a foreign
state is “inconvenient.” 249 After all, at the very least, these defendants will be
able to make remote appearances in their own defense, regardless of the
venue. 250

B.

Flaws in Ford’s Argument

Ford argues the “giving rise to” standard articulated in Bristol-Myers
Squibb narrows the scope of the minimum contacts analysis and

subsequently requires a jurisdictionally relevant contact that gives rise to the
plaintiff’s claim of harm. 251 Ford attempts to egregiously narrow the
minimum contact analysis by requiring a more pinpointed jurisdictionally
relevant claim of injury to allow for the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction. 252 This requirement is misguided, to say the least, because the
personal jurisdiction doctrine was originally crafted as a mechanism and
means to establish jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant and
bring the defendant into the forum where the injured plaintiff resides. 253
Ford argues that the result in Bristol-Myers Squibb—in which the
non-resident plaintiffs were denied specific personal jurisdiction—supports
its position that Minnesota courts exercising personal jurisdiction in the
Bandemer case would be inappropriate. 254 However, the Bristol-Myers
Squibb decision included language specifically indicating that non-resident
Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 755 (Minn. 2019); see Amici Curiae Brief for
Minnesota et al., supra note 244, at 5 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957)).
Joanna Goodman, Technology: LegalTech: Whose Team Are You On?, L. SOC’Y
GAZETTE (May 18, 2020), https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/whose-team-are-youon/5104284.article [https://perma.cc/8BLP-SDDP]; see also Lev Breydo, Can Covid-19
Help Catalyze LegalTech Adoption?, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 19, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/lega
l_analytics/2020/202005/fa_2/ [https://perma.cc/GZA5-4682].
Goodman, supra note 248; Breydo, supra note 248.
Goodman, supra note 248; Breydo, supra note 248.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752–55; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 32–
33.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752–53; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 32–
33.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945); see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 220 (1957).
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752–53 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017)).
247
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plaintiffs who were removed from the proceeding in California still had the
ability to join “together in a consolidated action in the States that have
general jurisdiction over . . . Bristol-Myers Squibb. Alternatively, the
non-resident plaintiffs could probably sue together in their respective home
States.” 255 Furthermore, the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision did not extend
jurisdiction to the plaintiffs who were “not forum-state residents and were
not injured” in California. 256 Conversely, in Bandemer, the plaintiff is a
forum-state resident, and the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
comport with previous Supreme Court personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. 257 The Bristol-Myers Squibb decision supports exercising
personal jurisdiction in the Bandemer case because Bristol-Myers Squibb
indicates that when a consumer good, such as a prescription drug or massmanufactured vehicle, enters the stream of commerce, 258 individuals can
bring a suit in the state in which they are injured. 259 Here, this logic supports
Bandemer’s right to bring suit against Ford in Minnesota, the state in which
he was injured. 260
In addition, regarding Bristol-Meyer Squibb, it is more accurate to
say the Court felt the case would have been better suited to establish
personal jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiffs had it been properly
certified as a class action. 261 The majority in Bristol-Myers Squibb
determined that preventing non-resident plaintiffs from joining the case in
California would not prevent the omitted plaintiffs “from joining together in
a consolidated action in the States that have general jurisdiction over BristolMyers Squibb.” 262 This statement does not support Ford’s attempts to
255
256
257
258

Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1177.
Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note 17, at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
Stream-of-Commerce Theory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The

principle that a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant
places a product in the general marketplace and the product causes injury or damage in the
forum state, as long as the defendant also takes other acts to establish some connection with
the forum state, as by advertising there or by hiring someone to serve as a sales agent there.”).
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1177; Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note
17, at 2.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1177; Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note
17, at 2; see also Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 752–53 (Minn. 2019).
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782–84; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (describing the
process to obtain proper certification for a class action); Class Action, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A lawsuit in which the court authorizes a single person or a
small group of people to represent the interests of a larger group; specif[ically], a lawsuit in
which the convenience either of the public or of the interested parties requires that the case
be settled through litigation by or against only a part of the group of similarly situated persons
and in which a person whose interests are or may be affected does not have an opportunity
to protect his or her interests by appearing personally or through a personally selected
representative, or through a person specially appointed to act as a trustee or guardian.”).
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1783.
259

260

261
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construe the decision in a manner that limits its liability for injuries that
Ford-manufactured products may cause. 263
Furthermore, in the petition for certiorari, Ford posits that a
plaintiff’s injury in a forum state is only sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s
contacts with the state and not the contacts of the defendant. 264 Ford attempts
to support this argument by stating, “the plaintiff would have experienced
this same injury wherever else he might have traveled, and [the plaintiff] . .
. just happened to travel to” the forum state. 265 However, even if
Bristol-Myers Squibb did narrow the application of personal jurisdiction to
require “but for” causation, the Minnesota court’s application of personal
jurisdiction in Bandemer would still be correct. 266 In the context of
Bandemer, “but for” Defendant Hanson’s purchase of an allegedly
negligently manufactured 1994 Ford Crown Victoria, there is no substantial
certainty that Plaintiff Bandemer would have experienced the same or
similar injuries. 267 Ford might argue that incorporating the facts from
Bandemer creates only a hypothetical and, therefore, overly attenuated
connection, but this merely speaks to the fragility of Ford’s next argument
in support of a causal standard. 268
Ford purports that a causal standard for establishing personal
jurisdiction should be adopted because “[a] causal test for specific personal
jurisdiction . . . furthers fairness. It ensures that a defendant will have fair
warning that a particular activity may subject it to the jurisdiction of a foreign
sovereign.” 269 However, this argument is not persuasive because Ford is
simply attempting to narrow its own accountability when facing individuals
injured by products that Ford placed in the stream of commerce. 270 Ford
affirmatively availed itself to jurisdiction in Minnesota by continuously
engaging in activities such as advertising and manufacturing its vehicles for
the purpose of sale in the state. 271 As a result of the continuous contacts Ford
exhibited with Minnesota, Ford should reasonably foresee and anticipate a
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 1 (arguing that Ford should expect specific
personal jurisdiction to be exercised in the forum of the first sale of a particular widget).
See id. at 32.
See id. at 33.

263

264
265

See id.
See id.; Levi M. Klinger-Christiansen, The Nexus Requirement After Bristol-Myers: Does
“Arise out of or Relate to” Require Causation?, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1145, 1146–47
(2020) (noting that Bristol-Myers “narrowed the understanding of . . . the nexus requirement”
266
267

to “require at-least but-for causation between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum
contacts in most situations”).
Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 752–53 (Minn. 2019); see also Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 212, at 23–26.
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 26–27 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
268

269

270
271
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court challenge that arises, or relates to, any alleged injuries involving a
vehicle the company manufactured. 272
This position is only strengthened when the injury relates to a
defective airbag, a known issue in vehicles for the past decade. 273 It would
seem Ford is attempting to enjoy the benefits of a free market while
simultaneously seeking to shield itself from any liability by using recent
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence that treats the Due Process Clause as a
proxy for jurisdictional analysis. Given the company’s reliance on national
and global streams of commerce, this jurisdictional analysis would be better
served by applying principles applicable to the interstate and international
commerce clauses, not the restrictive, individualistic notions of due
process. 274
Additionally, Ford stated in oral arguments that it would be unfair
to subject the company to Minnesota’s courts and juries. 275 However, the
real travesty would be freeing manufacturers from liability where their
vehicles are sold by an owner in one state, purchased by a driver in another,
and subsequently the vehicle injures a private party due to a product defect
but the injured individual is unable to litigate in the state where the injury
occurred because Ford believed it was unfair in Bandemer. 276 If the private
sale of an automobile is allowed to shield automakers from liability, car
manufacturers may be incentivized to build shoddier vehicles knowing they
will not face repercussions in the event a vehicle breaks down after several
years have passed and the car has changed hands since the initial purchase. 277

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 873 (2011); University of South
Carolina School of Law, McIntyre: Specific Jurisdiction and Stream of Commerce,

272
273
274

YOUTUBE
(Mar.
28,
2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKS49u59xrI
[https://perma.cc/9U3J-GELG] (discussion at 30:20).
Oral Argument at 11:05, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. _
(2021)
(No.19-368
&
No.
19-369),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-368
[https://perma.cc/VQE3-LQJP]. During a colloquy between Justice Breyer and Attorney
Sean Marotta regarding what would be unfair about litigating in both Minnesota and
Montana, attorney Sean Marotta stated “I think what’s unfair about it is that Ford has to be
subject to the rulings of Montana and Minnesota judges, be subject to the verdicts of Montana
and Minnesota juries, be subject to the Montana and Minnesota Rules of Evidence and
Procedure, and even if you don’t think that’s a significant burden on Ford because Ford’s a
big company, the rule you’ll announce in this case applies to much smaller manufacturers.”
275

Id.
Id. But cf. Brief for Respondents, supra note 213, at 34 (indicating that depriving an injured
276

resident access to the courts in the state in which they reside would be unfair).
Trent Gillies, Car Owners are Holding Their Vehicles for Longer, Which is Both Good
and Bad, CNBC (May 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/28/car-owners-are-holdingtheir-vehicles-for-longer-which-is-both-good-and-bad.html [https://perma.cc/B2F3-JWEL]
(discussing how individuals are owning their vehicles for longer periods of time); see also
277
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Historically, motor-vehicle companies have opposed government
regulations. 278 As a result, trusting the automobile industry to independently
improve the safety of its products, while narrowing the specific personal
jurisdiction doctrine, is inappropriate. 279 This is particularly true given the
endless parade of reports chronicling defective airbag inflators in new
vehicles. 280
Lastly, tort law further frustrates Ford’s argument in favor of
adopting a causal standard for determining personal jurisdiction. Tort law,
which previously embraced the influence of causal (proximate cause)
thinking in the First and Second Restatements, has diverged and repudiated
the influence of causal thinking in the Third Restatement of Torts. 281 Here,
Ford argues that a causal standard would ensure predictability and
federalism. 282 However, it is difficult to credit these arguments when the field
of law that widely attempted to use causal standards is now retreating from
the theories’ use. 283

C.

Possible Reasons Why Ford Advocates for Changes to Personal
Jurisdiction
1.

Historic Levels of Pro-Business Supreme Court Justices

The Roberts Court is “highly pro-business—the conservatives
extremely so and the liberals only moderately liberal.” 284
infra text accompanying note 298 (defining and discussing planned obsolescence in the

automobile industry).
See generally Russel Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 [https://perma.cc/8S5Y-46TW]
(describing how Volkswagen built a bypass mechanism that could tell when it was being tested
and could temporarily modify emissions to pass the admissions test rather than
manufacturing a vehicle that met government emission requirements).
Takata Airbag Recall: Everything You Need to Know, CONSUMER REP. (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.consumerreports.org/car-recalls-defects/takata-airbag-recall-everything-youneed-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/DW6X-X8D7].
278

279

280

Id.

For a more detailed analysis, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. g (AM. L.
INST. 2012).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 42.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 2012).
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1449 (2013) (analyzing and comparing present day
Supreme Court data sets involving businesses as either the petitioner or respondent with
previous iterations of the Court); see also Michelle Conlin, Dan Levine & Lisa Girion,
Special Report: Why Big Business Can Count on Courts to Keep its Deadly Secrets,
REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courts-secrecy-lobbyistspecialre/special-report-why-big-business-can-count-on-courts-to-keep-its-deadly-secretsidUSKBN1YN1GF [https://perma.cc/4623-BCR4]; Adam Winkler, Why Big Business
Keeps Winning at the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017),
281

282
283
284
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Business petitioners accounted for 34.7% of the Business
Litigant Dataset from 1946 to 1968 (the Vinson and
Warren Courts), 54.0% from 1969 to 2004 (the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts), and 64.9% since 2005 (the Roberts
Court). The increases in the separate win rates for business
petitioners and business respondents . . . have been more
modest. For business petitioners, the win rate is 45.0% in
the Vinson and Warren Courts, 54.4% in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, and 64.0% in the Roberts Court. For
business respondents, the win rates in those three Courts
are 23.3%, 30.5%, and 37.0%, respectively. 285
Furthermore, Justices Alito, Roberts, Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia are
among the ten most business-friendly Justices to serve on the Court since
1946. 286 Given the unprecedented favorable decisions the Robert’s Court
has issued for corporations, corporate defendants often select specific cases
to appeal up to the Court in order to set favorable precedents moving
forward. 287

2.

Using, or Advocating for Change to, Existing Judicial Procedures
to Limit Corporate Liability

Prior to several asbestos settlements, which constituted the largest
mass tort action in the United States in terms of number of claims, the
judicial system largely permitted individuals unfettered access to evidence
logs from court proceedings. 288 Information gathered by attorney Ronald
Motley, in an openly-available evidence log, helped establish the
cornerstone for many arguments and claims against corporations for
knowingly exposing employees to asbestos. 289 In the aftermath, corporations
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/
2017/06/26/why-big-businesskeeps-winning-at-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/GM4G-QWZX] (detailing the probusiness mindset of the Supreme Court following the appointment of Justice Gorsuch and
identifying the pro-business federation known as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that filed
amicus briefs in fifteen cases—with “11 wins and only three losses (one case remains to be
decided)”); About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.,
https://www.uschamber.com/about/about-the-us-chamber-of-commerce
[https://perma.cc/WG5L-BPRE].
Epstein et al., supra note 284, at 1453–54.
Id. at 1449.
See generally OYEZ, supra note 211 (arguing that the court should adopt a causation rule
of personal jurisdiction or state of first sale, to ensure that Ford is only liable to individuals
that purchase Ford vehicles from certified dealerships); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212,
at 15.
Conlin et al., supra note 284 (describing the history of corporations advocating to keep
various kinds of information under seal during and after litigation).
285
286
287

288

289
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and their “lawyers and lobbyists . . . [moved] to hide evidence that they
sacrificed their customers’ [and employees’] health and safety in the name
of corporate efficiencies” by seeking to keep a myriad of documents and
interviews under seal. 290
Corporate attorneys routinely convince judges to seal court filings,
ensuring that information and evidence giving rise, or relating, to the claim
at hand remains hidden once the product liability case is settled. 291 The effect
of courts sealing documents contributes to the compounding negative health
and safety repercussions for private citizens who unknowingly interacted
with dangerous products. 292 Various consumer product lines demonstrate
the cascading negative impact of sealed evidence on the health and safety of
private citizens. The products themselves range across industries, including
prescription drugs, firearms, and motor vehicles. 293
Ford, as a large-cap company, 294 has nearly infinite financial
resources and can bring procedural challenges, such as personal jurisdiction
in Bandemer, that border on frivolous. This is particularly problematic in
disputes that pit companies against private parties, where companies often

Id. (quoting U.S. Representative Hank Johnson from Georgia).
Id. (detailing how keeping court information under seal led to nearly 250,000 separate
death and injury lawsuits); see also Facts + Statistics: Product Liability, INS. INFO. INST.,

290
291

https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-product-liability [https://perma.cc/ES6J-K2GC]
(reiterating that most lawsuits are settled out of court).
Conlin et al., supra note 284.
See id.; Jan Hoffman, Payout From a National Opioids Settlement Won’t Be as Big as
Hoped, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/health/nationalopioid-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/52H2-MVMS] (describing the state of ongoing
litigation involving thousands of cities “suing the pharmaceutical industry”); Remington:
Product Safety Warning and Recall Notice, REMINGTON ARMS CO.,
https://xmprecall.remington.com/ [https://perma.cc/G2GZ-XSL9] (describing how the
trigger on one model of Remington firearm may experience unintended discharge even when
the safety is on and the trigger has not been pulled); Justice for Deadly Rollover Roof Crush
Accidents: Injury/Paralysis, DEFECTS LAWYER, https://defectslawyer.com/rollover-roofcrush-accident/ [https://perma.cc/X7VR-A7YP] (describing the heighted potential for injury
in an SUV as a result of a rollover accident); see also Rollover: The Hidden History of the
SUV,
PBS
FRONTLINE,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/rollover/unsafe/cron.html
[https://perma.cc/E9BC-GEFR]
(describing the history of the SUV and initial attempts at greater regulation of the vehicles
design).
James Chen, Market Capitalization, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 3. 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp [https://perma.cc/Q322PLMF] (“Large-cap” companies have “a market capitalization of $10 billion or more [and] .
. . market capitalization refers to the total dollar market value of a company’s outstanding
shares of stock.”); see also Ford Motor Company, YAHOO! FINANCE,
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/F/ [https://perma.cc/RV76-JBK9] (showing that Ford has a
market cap of 30.315 billion dollars).
292
293

294
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use aggressive motion practice to drain opponents of funds in order to force
concessions and negotiate settlements. 295
Here, the parties in Bandemer have debated the issue of personal
jurisdiction for nearly three years, which, on its face, contravenes the
overriding goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 296 Here, Ford
knows that a majority of product liability claims settle prior to trial, so if it is
able to petition for its desired changes to the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction, the company will be able to avoid liability in at least some
instances by convincing a judge that any future lawsuit lacks specific personal
jurisdiction. At a minimum, this creates another procedural hurdle for
prospective plaintiffs because plaintiffs will incur greater costs in justifying a
challenge to personal jurisdiction, while a corporate defendant may see
significant cost savings if a claim is dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 297
Furthermore, narrowing specific personal jurisdiction as Ford
proposes is asinine because Ford deliberately chooses to cannibalize its
market each year by manufacturing new makes and models of its vehicles
with mostly aesthetic changes. This is a business practice commonly
referred to as perceived obsolescence. 298 As a result, private sales often occur
while cars are quite new, which renders the exclusion of liability after the
private sale of a motor vehicle nonsensical. 299 Consider an example
analogous to the hypothetical posed by Justice Clarence Thomas during oral
arguments: An individual purchases a new Ford, drives it home, and then
subsequently needs to sell the newly purchased vehicle for reasons
unrelated to the car. Ford’s personal jurisdiction argument would create a
situation in which a private purchaser of the “new” vehicle would be unable
to sue Ford for a product liability defect, despite the total absence of changes
Ford Motor Revenue 2006–2020, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/
charts/F/ford-motor/revenue [https://perma.cc/T63F-KYDP] (reporting that Ford had
annual reported revenues of: $156.776 billion, $160.338 billion, and $155.900 billion for
the years 2016, 2017, and 2018 respectively); see also YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note
20, at 477.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed, administered, and employed
by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.”).
See supra text accompanying note 291 (describing the costs corporations face with mass
tort litigation); see also infra text accompanying note 302 (detailing the approximate number
of defective takata airbags in Ford vehicles which could potentially become instances of
liability in future personal injury lawsuits).
What
is
Planned
Obsolescence?,
FIN.
REFERENCE,
https://www.financereference.com/learn/ planned-obsolescence [https://perma.cc/3WZNTMYE] (“Planned obsolescence, premature obsolescence or built-in obsolescence is a
strategic policy of deliberately producing consumer goods designed to rapidly become
obsolete, useless and require replacing.”).
Cf. Oral Argument, supra note 275, at 7:08.
295

296

297
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made to the vehicle after its original purchase from a motor-vehicle
dealership. 300
In essence, Ford’s rule relating to first sale and proximate cause
completely eliminates Ford’s liability for vehicles it manufactured once the
car is sold by a private party. 301 This opens a gap in the law and incentivizes
the company to push for narrower standards for establishing personal
jurisdiction because it would help Ford dismiss future lawsuits prior to any
settlement negotiations. 302
Ford argues that “due process limits on the State’s adjudicative
authority principally protect[s] the liberty of the non-resident defendant not
the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.” 303 If Ford truly believed in
their “defendant’s convenience” argument, it could have moved to dismiss
the matter for improper venue. 304
Ford is not the first corporation, and it will not be the last to
advocate for changes to judicial precedent to limit its future liability or make
300
301

Id.
Cf. id. Justice Clarence Thomas asked Petitioner’s Attorney Sean Marotta whether Ford

could be sued in a state if a private individual saw an advertisement for a used Ford and
subsequently purchased it. Marotta stated: “If you bought . . . [the vehicle] from, you know
just a private party, no. If you purchased . . . [the vehicle] from your local Ford dealer, yes.”
Id. at 8:40; see also MINN. STAT. § 168.27, subdiv. 8(b)(2) (2020) (exempting private
individuals who sell or lease five or less vehicles a year from licensure as a Minnesota motorvehicle
dealer);
Motor Vehicle Dealers License, MINN. ELICENSING,
https://mn.gov/elicense/a-z/?id=1083231321#/list/appId//filterType//filterValue//page/1/sort// order/ [https://perma.cc/MNF6PLXR].
See Amy Martyn, Ford to Customers: Your Airbag May Kill You, Now Please Wait for
the Repair, CONSUMER AFFS. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/fordto-customers-your-airbag-may-kill-you-now-please-wait-for-the-repair-011818.html
[https://perma.cc/M2EA-4VWA] (showing that as recently as 2006 Ford had nearly 3,000
Ford Ranger vehicles that posed as an injury risk to consumers); see also Takata Recall
Spotlight,
NAT’L
HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC
SAFETY
ADMIN.,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/takata-recall-spotlight
[https://perma.cc/G4WS-N6SJ]
(reporting that there are nearly 57,400,000 defective Takata Air Bags in vehicles across the
United States, and that the wide-reaching range of impacted Ford manufactured vehicles
indicates that Ford may be attempting to make it more difficult for injured parties to maintain
lawsuits against it for injuries sustained in accidents involving defective airbags); Takata
Airbag Recall, supra note 279 (describing additional makes and models identified as having
defective airbags).
Reply Brief for Petitioner, Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (2020)
(Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 2133053, at *3 (Apr. 2020) (quoting Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014)).
Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., No. 77–CV–16–1025, 2017 WL 101185684, at *2 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. May 25, 2017) (describing that Ford was improperly served with notice in an
improper venue in 2016, but it subsequently moved to voluntarily transfer venue to Todd
County, where the Hanson Defendants resided, under Minnesota Statute § 542.01 and in so
doing, it accepted the venue when service of process was amended in 2017); see generally
MINN. STAT. § 542.01 (2020).
302

303

304
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it more difficult for an injured plaintiff to have his or her day in court. 305 For
example, in 2017, Microsoft successfully argued to prevent the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals from reviewing the denial of a class action certification
after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action with prejudice. 306 The
rationale for this decision comes from the Court’s position that a voluntary
dismissal with prejudice should not be allowed to circumvent the final
judgment rule as a way to appeal the denial of a class’s certification. 307 This
decision, in effect, makes it more difficult for a class of similarly injured
parties to challenge the denial of class-action certification at the district court
level in the event that the appellate court also denies review of class
certification in accord with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 308 The
Microsoft decision was ultimately favorable to corporations facing classaction lawsuits. 309

D. An Unsolicited Suggestion to Resolve the Unintentional Availment
Concerns
The answer to whether jurisdiction could be exercised over a local
manufacturer in Maine 310 or a small business that has not intentionally
cultivated a market in a specific foreign-state can be determined by
borrowing a legal rule developed in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 311
Parklane considered the extent to which offensive use of collateral estoppel,
also known as issue preclusion, could prevent a defendant from relitigating
facts that had already been determined in a previously closed case. 312 The
Court held that, although the offensive use of collateral estoppel does not
promote judicial economy, it would not result in unfairness to the defendant
when the plaintiff could not have easily joined in the previous action. 313 The
Court permits defensive use of collateral estoppel because it precludes a
plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely switching adversaries. 314
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 13–14; see generally Bandemer v. Ford Motor
Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 759 (Minn. 2019).
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1706–07 (2017) (describing that voluntary
dismissal will not be considered a final decision and will not allow an individual to appeal the
denial of class certification under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f)).
See Microsoft Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1706–07; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
See Microsoft Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1706–07.
See id.; see also Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Reject Lax Rule Permitting Free
Review of Decisions Denying Class Certification, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 13, 2017),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion-analysis-justices-reject-lax-rule-permittingfree-review-decisions-denying-class-certification/ [https://perma.cc/H3FK-FFNA].
Oral Argument, supra note 275, at 33:09.
439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 322.
Id. at 322–23.
305

306
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Meanwhile, the Court granted wide discretion to trial courts to determine
the permissibility of offensive use of collateral estoppel. 315
Similarly, in Bandemer, the Court can adopt a similar theory
regarding the application of specific personal jurisdiction, providing district
courts with wide discretion to determine whether a given foreign defendant
advertised in the forum state with the intent to cultivate a market or if the
contacts were merely coincidental. 316 The district courts’ adoption of this
flexible determination would ensure a mechanism exists to satisfy the fears
Ford raises in its petition relating to small-scale manufacturers being unduly
burdened by the specific personal jurisdiction doctrine as it presently
exists. 317 Furthermore, the legal rule would help address the concerns voiced
by Chief Justice Roberts and some of the other Justices relating to small
business operations that did not consistently market their goods nationally.
The defensive framework of the rule could relate to the holding in BristolMyers Squibb, preventing non-resident plaintiffs from using a foreign state’s
court to adjudicate an injury without sufficient plaintiff contacts to the
foreign state. 318 Lastly, it would affirm specific personal jurisdiction in
Bandemer because Ford does advertise and cultivate a market in
Minnesota. 319
V. OPPOSING ARGUMENT: MINNESOTA DID NOT
PROPERLY EXERCISE SPECIFIC JURISDICTION 320
The holding in Bandemer does not comply with federal due
process requirements for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. 321 For a
court to find that a defendant maintains sufficient minimum contacts under
the Due Process Clause, it must examine the quantity of the contacts with
the forum state arising from the defendant’s conduct, the nature and quality
of those contacts, and the connection between those contacts and the cause
of action. 322
Here, while the quantity of Ford’s contacts is high due to Ford’s
generic activities in Minnesota, the contacts’ quality and nature, as well as
315
316

Id. at 331.
See Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 747–53 (Minn. 2019); cf. Parklane,

439 U.S. at 322–23.
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 747–53.
Oral Argument, supra note 275, at 33:09.
See generally Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 747–53.
This section of the analysis is authored exclusively by Kevin Deno.
See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 931 (2014) (holding
when both the defendant’s conduct and the underlying controversy lack a forum state
connection, the court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction).
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (listing the five factors that Minnesota courts must find
to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a company not in personam).
317
318
319
320
321
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their connection to the cause of action, fall well below what is required for
the purposes of federal due process. 323 These inadequacies stem from three
deficiencies. 324 First, Ford acted through an untargeted marketing campaign
that merely included Minnesota. 325 Second, Ford did not include 1994
Crown Victorias in its Minnesota advertisements. 326 Third, Ford dealerships
are independently owned entities. 327

A.

Factor One: The Quantity of Contacts between the Forum State and
the Defendant’s Conduct

The facts in Bandemer satisfy the first factor for the minimum
contact analysis under the Due Process Clause. 328 For the contacts to be
significant, they must extend beyond unilateral activity and constitute
targeted actions within the forum state. 329 Unilateral contact, insufficient for
jurisdictional purposes, occurs when contacts arise solely from activities
initiated by plaintiffs. 330
Here, Ford sold around two thousand 1994 Crown Victorias and
two hundred thousand other vehicles at franchisee dealerships in Minnesota
from 2013 to 2015. 331 Additionally, Ford operated a continuous advertising
campaign through direct mail advertisements that targeted Minnesotans
alongside a national advertisement campaign. 332 Ford also fabricated a
branded Mustang for the Minnesota Vikings, hosted a 2016 “Ford
Experience Tour” in Minnesota, and created a driver training camp for
Minnesotan teens. 333 Finally, Ford collected data from its dealerships in
See id. at 748 (listing the facts demonstrating Ford’s contacts including national
advertisements, general car sales, employees, and data collection practices); Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (finding that a defendant’s
general connections with a forum state are not sufficient to establish specific personal
jurisdiction under federal due process).
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748 (analyzing the contacts Ford had with Minnesota
including advertising, sales, and dealerships).
See id. at 760–62 (Anderson, J. dissenting) (arguing Ford acted through an untargeted
marketing sale which happened to include vehicle advertisements in Minnesota).
See id. at 757 (arguing the Crown Victoria did not appear within Ford’s Minnesota
advertisements).
Id. (arguing that Ford dealerships in Minnesota were independently owned).
See id. at 749 (stating that the first factor is “the quantity of contacts with the forum state”).
See id. at 751 (“This suit’s connection with Minnesota is beyond ‘the mere unilateral
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant’ . . . rather, the
connection is based on Ford’s own actions in targeting Minnesota for sales.”) (citing WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)).
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (discussing how the lack of car distribution
in a tristate area rendered interactions by the defendant unilateral in nature).
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748.
323

324

325

326

327
328
329

330
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333
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Minnesota about its customers’ cars for information regarding automobile
redesign and repair. 334
The facts in Bandemer mirror the seminal personal jurisdiction
case, International Shoe, 335 but are distinguishable from Bristol-Myers
Squibb and World-Wide Volkswagen. 336 First, in International Shoe, 337 the
company’s actions produced substantial interstate business through its sales
and service providers. 338 These activities included employing thirteen
salespeople within the state who conducted International Shoe’s principal
business in the state. 339 Moreover, the salespeople advertised the company’s
services by presenting customers with sample shoes and rented sample
rooms that salespeople used to display the shoes. 340 These display areas
ranged from rooms in business buildings to rooms in hotels. 341 Thus, the
United States Supreme Court declared that personal jurisdiction was proper
because the company had sufficient contacts with the forum state through
its salespeople. 342
In Bandemer, Ford had a greater number of contacts with
Minnesota than International Shoe had with Washington. 343 The thousands
of car sales at Minnesota dealerships alone indicates that the contacts in
Bandemer exceeded those in International Shoe. 344 However, Ford also
created contacts through driving camps and dealerships. 345 Therefore, if the
contacts of thirteen International Shoe employees in Washington can satisfy
the quantity of contacts required for the first factor in a minimum contacts
analysis, then additional contacts, like those in Bandemer, also satisfy the
first minimum contacts factor. 346
334
335

Id.
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017); WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 326 (describing activities of salespeople in the forum state, as
336

337

well as how the company supplied and directed its salespeople).
338
339
340
341
342

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (stating personal jurisdiction was proper because of the company’s systematic and

continuous business in Washington).
See Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 2019) (listing Ford’s
contacts with Minnesota); see also Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 326 (describing International
Shoe’s activities in Washington).
See Bandemer. 931 N.W.2d at 760 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The fact that Ford sold
the Crown Victoria and thousands of other cars to dealerships in Minnesota cannot sustain
the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.”).
343

344

Id.
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 326 (finding personal jurisdiction was proper due to the
company’s systematic and continuous business in Washington); see also Bandemer, 931
345
346
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Thus, given the quantity of contacts, the Bandemer plaintiff’s claim
satisfies the first prong for minimum contacts analysis. 347 Accordingly, it is
unsurprising that Ford did not contest this minimum contacts factor. 348
However, as the Bristol-Myers Squibb Court noted, sufficient contacts with
the forum state by the defendant cannot outweigh both a lack of connection
between the defendant and the forum state and a lack of connection
between the defendant’s forum contacts and the cause of action. 349

B.

Factor Two: The Nature and Quality of the Defendant’s Contacts with
the Forum State

Bandemer’s facts do not satisfy the second factor of the minimum
contacts analysis for purposes of federal due process. 350 If the nature and
quality of the defendant’s contacts correlate with the plaintiff’s alleged harm,
then a court might be able to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
foreign entity via federal due process. 351 More specifically, the quality of the
connections must not be “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” 352
For its quality analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined
the same facts as detailed above in this section’s factor one analysis. 353 Under
these facts, the court held that Ford’s contacts were not random, fortuitous,
or attenuated, but rather a targeted marketing program by Ford in
Minnesota. 354
However, the court overlooked key facts, which, when combined
with the preceding facts, illustrate that Ford did not specifically target
Minnesota. 355 First, Ford did not specifically target Minnesota with its
advertising campaign but included the state in a national, untargeted
N.W.2d at 750 (holding that Ford had a sufficient quantity of contacts with Minnesota to
satisfy the first prong of minimum contacts analysis).
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (indicating when considering quantity of the contacts,
the court must examine the contacts alleged by the plaintiff by looking at the totality of the
facts).
Id. at 751.
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)
(“For specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections with the forum are not
enough.”).
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (explaining the second factor involves “the nature and
quality of [the defendant’s] contacts”).
See id. at 748.
See id. at 760–62 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (describing the untargeted nature of Ford’s
advertising and sales due to the absence of any reference to Crown Victorias or their
fabrication).
See supra notes 330–333 and accompanying text (detailing Ford’s contacts with
Minnesota).
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 750–51 (majority opinion) (stating Ford purposefully
availed itself to Minnesota through its marketing, sales, property, and employee contacts).
See id. at 760–62 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
347

348
349

350

351
352
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advertising campaign that specifically targeted no individual state with
increased frequency. 356 These strategies included national advertising and
direct mail sent to all Ford consumers regardless of whether they were
located in Minnesota. 357 Also, Ford created databases that allow all of its
dealerships to gain information about Ford’s vehicles concerning service
and repair; these dealerships are all independently owned and operated
both in Minnesota and across the United States. 358 Additionally, Minnesota
dealerships, along with dealerships throughout the United States, sent Ford
information about vehicle performance that Ford could use when
considering future designs. 359 However, as the data was for future designs,
this collection was not related to 1994 Crown Victorias. 360 Clearly then, the
facts describe untargeted efforts by a company that collected and presented
information to independently owned and operated dealerships in
Minnesota. This, when considered alongside the facts articulated by the
court, deeply erodes the quality of Ford’s advertising contacts within the
state. 361
Furthermore, the court overlooked the origin of the plaintiff’s
claim, the car’s manufacturing and assembly location, and other factors that
contributed to the car entering the stream of commerce in Minnesota when
it considered the nature of Ford’s contacts with the forum state. 362 Here, the
vehicle’s passenger, Bandemer, brought product liability, negligence, and
breach-of-warranty claims for an injury that occurred when the driver
collided with a snowplow and the airbags failed to deploy. 363 When
considering these claims, the court should have examined and given weight
to conduct that either aided in the car’s construction or placed the car into
Minnesota’s stream of commerce. 364 First, the Crown Victoria’s airbag

356
357
358
359
360

See id.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“Ford receives information regarding vehicle performance from ‘across the United

States, including in Minnesota,’ that may be used when considering future designs.”).
See id. at 750 (majority opinion) (“This minimum-contacts inquiry must ‘look[] to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself’ and not the defendant’s ‘random fortuitous,
or attenuated’ contacts with ‘persons affiliated with the State.’”) (quoting Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 285–86 (2014)).
See id. at 757 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (describing Bandemer’s complaint against Ford as
containing product liability, negligence, and breach-of-warranty claims); see also id. at 758
(stating that the Crown Victoria in question was designed in Michigan, assembled in Ontario,
Canada, sold in Bismarck, North Dakota, and finally registered in Minnesota in 2011).
Id. at 757.
See id. at 759 (“In fact, all of the relevant conduct that frames the basis for Bandemer’s
claims took place well before the 1994 Crown Victoria was first registered in Minnesota in
2011 by someone other than the parties to this lawsuit.”).
361

362

363
364
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system was designed in Michigan. 365 Second, the vehicle was assembled in
Ontario, Canada. 366 Third, the car was originally sold in North Dakota to a
third party uninvolved in the claim. 367 Fourth, another third party,
uninvolved in the claim and unrelated to Ford, brought the Crown Victoria
to Minnesota. 368 Therefore, while the crash occurred in Minnesota, the
remaining facts tying the plaintiff’s claims to Ford, all occurred outside the
state and occurred at least seventeen years before the plaintiff’s claim. 369
Thus, given the evidential weight, the quality and nature of Ford’s contacts
with Minnesota are poor because Ford’s construction, design, and sale of
the airbags all occurred outside of the state. 370
Moreover, these facts mirror those found in controlling and
persuasive cases. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that specific personal jurisdiction did not apply to the
seller because the car came to Oklahoma by chance after its sale in New
York, and the manufacturer made no specific effort to push the car into the
state. 371 Furthermore, courts have reinforced that the happenstance of
circumstances does not create personal jurisdiction in other cases. In
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., the Fourth Circuit found
that a state did not have personal jurisdiction over a tire retailer when the
tire popped while the driver traveled in the forum state. 372 In Reilly v. Phil
Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., a federal court in New Jersey found that a Wisconsin
seller of defective automotive jacks could not be hauled into a New Jersey
court simply because the damage occurred in New Jersey. 373 A Minnesota
district court found that Alaska did not have personal jurisdiction over a
Florida company that sold concession materials when a defective bottle,
which had been sold in Florida, was carried to and caused injuries in
Alaska. 374 Finally, that same Minnesota court did not find personal
jurisdiction over a helicopter company when a helicopter sold by the
company crashed as it traveled through the state. 375

365
366
367
368
369
370

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (describing Ford’s activities and their relation to plaintiff’s claims).
See id. at 751 (stating that a strong “connection is based on [a company’s] own actions in

targeting Minnesota for sales”).
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980) (describing
how a car sold by a corporation randomly ended up in the forum state through no act of the
company).
239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956).
372 F. Supp. 1205, 1206–07 (D.N.J. 1974).
Uppgren v. Exec. Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170–71 (D. Minn. 1969).
Id. at 172.
371

372
373
374
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Much like these cases, the car in Bandemer arrived in Minnesota
through similar happenstance. 376 The 1994 Crown Victoria was first sold in
North Dakota and only arrived in Minnesota in 2011, when its fourth owner
registered the car there—seventeen years after the car’s original sale. 377
Furthermore, Ford dealerships in Minnesota are independently owned and
operated, and no advertisement by Ford included a Crown Victoria. 378
Therefore, the 1994 Crown Victoria came to Minnesota outside of Ford’s
control, and Ford directed no advertisements or sales for the car because
Minnesotan dealerships are independent franchises. 379 Accordingly, specific
personal jurisdiction should not apply because Minnesota courts cannot
exercise specific personal jurisdiction when the litigation lacks a connection
between the forum and the controversy. 380
Considering these facts, Ford neither targeted Minnesotans with
advertisements involving 1994 Crown Victorias, nor sold 1994 Crown
Victorias to Minnesotans directly, thus undermining the targeting needed
for specific personal jurisdiction. 381 Furthermore, the court failed to consider
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s relevance, where the Court ruled that pills produced
or consumed outside California failed to establish specific personal
jurisdiction. 382 Here, Ford designed the airbags in Michigan, manufactured
them in Canada, and did not include the airbags in any advertisements in
Minnesota. 383 Therefore, the connections required for specific personal
jurisdiction occurred entirely outside Minnesota. The only other
connections involved the actions of third-party franchise owners, private
owners, and nationally targeted advertisements. Accordingly, the facts do
not satisfy the second minimum contacts factor necessary to establish
personal jurisdiction. 384

376
377
378
379

Id.
Id. at 757–58.

Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 758 (Minn. 2019) (Anderson, J., dissenting).

See id. (“It is undisputed that Ford dealerships in Minnesota are independently owned and

operated.”).
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)
(noting personal jurisdiction requires a connection between the forum state and the
underlying controversy).
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (requiring
some sales or other services).
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 759 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (stating general connections with the forum
are not enough to create specific personal jurisdiction).
380

381
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Factor Three: The Connection of the Defendant’s Contacts to the
Cause of Action

Finally, Bandemer’s facts do not satisfy the third minimumcontact factor as the defendant’s contacts lack any connection to the cause
of action. 385 If the cause of action is sufficiently connected with the
defendant’s contacts, then the facts satisfy a personal jurisdiction analysis. 386
Conversely, as noted in Walden v. Fiore, “mere injury to a forum resident
is not a sufficient connection to the forum” to establish personal
jurisdiction. 387
In Bandemer, the court again overlooked relevant facts that
undermine its finding of personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s product
liability claims. 388 Since these claims directly involve the airbag of a 1994
Crown Victoria, the court should have analyzed the car’s manufacture and
design. 389 The airbag’s construction occurred outside of Minnesota and
seventeen years before the accident giving rise to the case. 390 Therefore,
while these actions may relate to the plaintiff’s claims, they arose both outstate and many years prior.
Furthermore, the evidence does not support the conclusion that
Ford’s data collection practices created a sufficient connection to the
plaintiff’s claim. 391 The Bristol-Myers Squibb Court stated that a company’s
undertaking of matters within the forum state, but unrelated to the claim,
are insufficient and irrelevant when deciding whether to subject a company
to the forum state’s specific personal jurisdiction. 392 Here, Ford’s data
collection practices involved taking data from independent dealerships for
the development of future cars, which does not involve 1994 Crown
Victorias. 393 Ford’s engineers stated that the information collected from
these dealerships did not influence the design of the 1994 Crown Victoria. 394
Because contemporary data collection practices do not affect the design of
385

See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (“(3) the connection of the cause of action with these

contacts.”).
386

Id.

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014).
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d. at 757–58 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (discussing the car’s
construction and sale and Ford’s advertising efforts within Minnesota).
See id. at 758 (stating the plaintiff’s “strict liability claim alleges that Ford ‘designed,
manufactured, advertised, marked, tested, inspected, furnished, sold, and distributed’” the
car).
387
388

389

390
391

Id.
See id. at 759 (describing Ford’s data collection from independently owned and operated

dealerships for future car designs).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 759 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The engineer in no way
indicated that Minnesota data influenced the design . . . of the Crown Victoria.”).
392
393

394

Id.

2021]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION: A “SHOE” IN DOCTRINE?

1209

a 1994 Crown Victoria’s airbags, Ford’s practices do not have a connection
with the plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the data collection practices are
irrelevant and insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. 395
While Ford did conduct some advertising that specifically targeted
Minnesotans, these actions do not satisfy the connection test required by
Bristol-Myers Squibb. 396 Here, Ford led its “Ford Experience Tour,”
manufactured a Ford Mustang for the Minnesota Vikings, hosted a teen
camp, and sponsored many athletic events in Minnesota. 397 However, none
of these undertakings specifically referenced a 1994 Crown Victoria or its
airbags. 398 Also, Ford’s advertising efforts from the mid-2010s did not
contribute to development of the 1994 Crown Victoria. Therefore, because
Ford’s specific actions in Minnesota do not reference the plaintiff’s claim,
they are insufficient and irrelevant when deciding if Minnesota can exert
personal jurisdiction over Ford as dictated by Bristol-Myers Squibb. 399
Additionally, in its advertisements, Ford did not display the 1994
Crown Victoria or its airbags, which destroys the requisite connection
between Ford’s actions and the plaintiff’s claim to support personal
jurisdiction. 400 In Rilley, the court agreed with numerous other courts that if
a company’s advertising campaign is purely national in scope and is not
directed at the forum state, then the advertising does not support personal
jurisdiction. 401 Here, Ford conducted national advertising campaigns
through direct mail and other means that reached Minnesotan markets. 402
Ford made no unique efforts to target Minnesota through its national
marketing. Therefore, the advertising campaigns cannot support specific
personal jurisdiction.
Given these advertising conditions, Bandemer is distinguishable
from Rilley’s holding. 403 In Rielly, while a payday loan company advertised
through a national campaign that did not specifically target Minnesotans, the

395
396

See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
See id. (stating general connections with the forum are not enough to create specific

personal jurisdiction).
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748.
397

398
399

Id.at 760 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (stating a company’s undertaking of matters

within the forum state unrelated to the claim are insufficient and irrelevant when deciding if
that company is subject to the forum state’s specific personal jurisdiction).
See Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 333–34 (Minn. 2016) (“[N]umerous
other courts . . . have rejected purely national advertising as a contact supporting personal
jurisdiction because such activity is not purposefully directed at the forum state.”).
Id. at 337.
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748.
See Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 325 (describing how MoneyMutual’s advertising violated
Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes by exceeding the maximum allowable APR).
400

401
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company used its ads to attract Minnesotans to its specific service. 404 Its
advertisements also directly referenced the service. 405 Conversely, Ford did
not voluntarily or specifically target Minnesotans with advertisements
featuring the 1994 Crown Victoria. Rather, its national marketing was
indiscriminate, the car was not featured in any of Ford’s advertisements
targeting Minnesota, and the model was not in the information collected by
dealerships. 406 Moreover, none of the camps, sponsorships, or other specific
actions involved a 1994 Crown Victoria. 407 Accordingly, Rilley and
Bandemer can coexist under the same rule.
In sum, Ford neither targeted Minnesota with advertisements
featuring Crown Victorias, nor directly sold Crown Victorias to Minnesotans
through corporate sales, making personal jurisdiction is inappropriate. 408
Furthermore, the court failed to consider Bristol-Myers Squibb’s holding
that pills produced and consumed outside California were insufficient to
confer specific personal jurisdiction. 409 Similarly, Ford designed its airbags
in Michigan, manufactured them in Canada, and never once advertised
them in Minnesota. 410 Therefore, the connections required for specific
personal jurisdiction occurred entirely outside Minnesota, and personal
jurisdiction cannot be established. 411
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Bandemer court considered a motion to dismiss the claim for
lack of personal jurisdiction. 412 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined
that personal jurisdiction was appropriate because sufficient minimum
contacts existed between Ford and the forum state. 413 However, it is possible
the Minnesota court erred in recognizing existing Supreme Court precedent

404
405
406

Id. at 337.
Id. at 325.
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (stating that defendant’s actions must be

intentional, expressly targeted at the forum, and done with knowledge that the forum state’s
plaintiffs would feel the injury’s strain); see also Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 750 (listing Ford’s
contacts with Minnesota).
Id. at 757.
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980 (requiring
some sales or other services).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 759 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (stating that a company’s undertaking of
matters within the forum state but unrelated to the claim are insufficient and irrelevant when
deciding if that company can be subjected to the forum state’s specific personal jurisdiction).
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 747–53 (majority opinion).
Id. at 755.
407
408

409
410
411
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that Ford met the requirements for specific personal jurisdiction in the first
place. 414
In its holding, the court argued that its application of decades-old
minimum contacts analysis was consistent with established precedent in
determining personal jurisdiction. 415 There are also important policy
considerations to this holding as businesses have proven they will use all
methods available to them to limit their own liability, whether this means
advocating for changes through lobbying or litigation. 416 Moreover,
businesses in the age of e-commerce utilize personal data to help promote
and tailor advertisements in an increasingly personalized manner. As a
result, courts should freely grant specific personal jurisdiction to help ensure
that grievances are heard in a timely manner and to promote the efficiency
of the courts. Not only that, in the age of e-commerce, the vast majority of
challenges to personal jurisdiction brought by defendant-corporation will
border on frivolous and constitute nothing more than a cynical effort to
leverage the financial resource imbalances between the parties, which
contravenes the goals laid out in the very first Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure. 417
However, it is possible that the Bandemer court wrongfully
permitted the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction under Minnesota’s
long-arm statute. 418 Federal due process requires that a defendant maintain
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, as determined by the
contacts’ quantity, nature, quality, and relevance. 419 Ford’s contacts with
Minnesota may fail to satisfy the requirements of minimum contact analysis
since Ford neither specifically marketed its 1994 Crown Victoria in
Minnesota, nor purposefully collected data from Minnesotans with an eye
towards the car’s development. 420 While the court found conduct sufficed to
establish jurisdiction, Ford argued that its actions were, instead, untargeted,
indiscriminate, and foreign to Minnesota which indicated contact short of
what is required under a minimum contacts analysis. 421 Therefore, it is
414
415
416
417
418

See supra Part V.
Id. at 750–55.
See supra Section IV.C.2.
See supra text accompanying note 8.
See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 744 (Minn. 2019) (discussing how Minnesota courts could

exercise personal jurisdiction over Ford due to the plethora of the company’s contacts with
the forum state); supra Part IV.
See id. at 749 (listing the factors required by due process to determine specific personal
jurisdiction).
See id. at 759 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (describing the nature of Ford’s contacts with
Minnesota).
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017)
(holding that a company’s connection with the forum state must constitute more than general
connections to satisfy minimum contact analysis).
419

420

421
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unsurprising that Ford petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court granted Ford’s petition for a writ
of certiorari and held oral arguments on October 7, 2020. 422 Ford argued for
the adoption of a causal relationship standard for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. 423 In contrast, Bandemer posited that adopting Ford’s
proposition would transition personal jurisdictional analysis into something
more akin to tort law’s proximate cause standard. 424 As mentioned, the
Court rendered a decision on March 25, 2021, holding that Ford was
properly subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Minnesota and
Montana. 425

See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 211; OYEZ, supra note 211; Oral Argument, supra note
275.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 15.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 213, at 10–12; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note
212.
Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court et al., 141 S. Ct. 1017,
1032 (2021) (holding that the connection between the claims and Ford’s in state activities
were sufficient for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction in both Minnesota and
Montana).
422

423
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Appendix: Ford Pass Loyalty Program Privacy Policy and Terms 426

FORD, supra note 229 (detailing Ford’s terms and conditions of the FordPass Loyalty
Program and the Privacy Policy provisions of the EULA has been screen captured for
posterity).
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Appendix: Ford Pass Loyalty Program Privacy Policy Continued 428

